28th October, 2024
2 days after Georgian parliamentary elections
How to steal the elections: Georgian edition
My naivety did not let me fully believe the game would be so rigged. The data consists of 2,749,674 eligible voters and, somehow, 3,508,294 ballots are claimed by the Election Administration of Georgia to have been cast. From this morning, press speakers from the latter administrative organ insist there was no place for corruption, that elections were held in a peaceful and just environment, that opposition parties intentionally share misinformation, that this is an organised campaign against whatever propaganda they desire to be sunk into this time.
In what follows, I present a toolkit for how to claim the illegitimate power in a country deprived and sick, where elections were won before anyone cast a single vote.
Step 1:
In the days leading up to October 26th, the pro-Russian ruling party, Georgian Dream started massive ‘campaign’, especially outside of capital city – Tbilisi. This campaign mostly focused on taking away the ID cards of potential opposition voters, or buying them. In the second-largest city of Georgia, Kutaisi, the propaganda machine took a form of requests for personal numbers, targeting civil servants, and in this case, kindergarten teachers and their family members. In addition, they were asked to jot down their “wishes” in case of the party’s victory. Not one of them wished for anything beyond basic medical care. Some civil servants were not asked to write down wishes; instead, they were offered benefits in exchange for their personal numbers. The police was involved in the process too, leaving such digital footprint that it did not need any more clearance on the election day.
In a country that is ideologically sick, it nourishes from the mass poverty. The sickness, whether existential, medical, or cultural – becomes a very useful and convenient resource for the Russian puppet-state. The poverty and harsh social conditions are not recognized as problems, but a foundation for “legitimacy”, an endorsement of power. Voters were bought cheaply, at 50-100 GEL each (a mere 20-40 euros) courtesy of the oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili. Stagnation, alongside promises of “higher and higher”, “better and better”, “more and more Georgian” future are the only assets for clinging to power. The name of the party itself, “Georgian Dream” was part of the “not-really-there-yet reality plan”, and I have been sick of the word “dream” for a long time that is empty of any meaning.
Step 2:
Before election day, the GD party made certain that only a handpicked registrar of voters would oversee the process. This was ensured by the legislative change. Therefore, the position of registrar played their part: ID photos were often not checked against the faces of those who came to vote. The observers, in most instances, were not able to see the difference – they were restricted to go near to the regitrar’s table.
Step 3:
By buying the votes and taking away ID cards, we saw a classic example of carousel voting. People were able to cast multiple votes while moving from one place to another. Observers filmed case after case of these violations, and they got verbally and physically assaulted for this, or simply banned. Finger markings were often faded easily under soap and water. Some machines with UV lights to detect these markings were suspiciously broken. Observers who documented these failings and filed complaints often found themselves expelled from the premises, or worse – called upon and beaten by the Georgian thugs outside, who were also working for the GD.
November 6th, 2024
11 days after Georgian parliamentary elections
Following these events, being out of country, I started to cling onto online media. Several Facebook groups have become focal points for those opposing the regime, resonating amid these turbulencies. A sentiment quickly circulated in these Facebook groups, I saw many posts stating something along the lines of: “it would never be an easy task for us to overthrow this government anyway, how would you imagine life to be so simple?”. Indeed, it has long been challenging on a national level to claim its own space and identity while under the shadow of the Soviet Union, and neighboring Russia, let alone to overthrow a pro-Russian government in the midst of elections.
What interests me here is how living with this collective purpose shapes individual ways of living. A few years ago, my friend and I had a conversation about a phenomenon of “Georgian sadness”. He had just got back from his studies in Austria, and I remember him being struck by how easily a sense of happiness could be achieved in Vienna, and how people could feel content from simple pleasures – from having a cinnamon bun at a cozy café, or getting niche second-hand book found at an open-air market. “In contrast”, he said, “we do not allow ourselves that kind of joy; we have to break down and analyse the feeling of well-being before we can let it settle. We have to philosophise the very state of happiness as we do not accept it without question, but we put a demanding effort into introspection, almost as if it needs to be earned while asking ourselves whether it should feel good at all. Like, if we go skiing, it’s not enough to say it was fun – we frame it as a liberating experience, we talk about the grand, edgy mountains, the thrill of the descent, as if joy must be made complex to be valid.”
I would add that people around me, myself included, rarely describe sweet moments as “happy”. We do not seem to embrace these experiences but we feel the need to over-construct our feelings, rationalise them, turn them into something existential. This emotional landscape also inhabits our resilience against the regime. In the immediate aftermath of the elections when the shock effect was intact, these resilient practices found a foothold in the familiar terrain of endurance – that “ousting Russian government was never going to be easy, so why even be nihilistic about it when we are not used to simplicity anyway?”.
Having said this, I want to delve into the dynamics of activism in the context of Georgian elections. In offline spaces, such as streets overtaken by protesters, the pro-Russian government employs a range of strategies to delegitimise the very purpose of the demonstration, alongside with activists. This mechanism is usually manifested online through governmental TV channels that selectively share the demonstration footage, often forming hate-driven narratives, or underreporting attendance to portray “how purposeless the demonstration is due to a small amount of people”. Additionally, an army of bots attack real users in comment sections, further reinforcing hate language towards protests. I realised I became a bot also, however, I am attacking the ruling party in turn, through their online channels, media outlets and official FB pages of pro-Russian parliamentary members.
December 3rd, 2024
39 days after Georgian elections
Using fireworks as a tactic against water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets has proven effective so far, despite the government’s recent ban on local stores selling pyrotechnics. This form of resistance not only disrupts and belittles the suppression, but also symbolises the purpose of the protest movement. Precisely, street protests transcending the traditional resistance forms have formed a political and cultural space where people are actively reclaiming Georgia’s political landscape. This environment has become a platform for citizens to practice solidarity, and show the defiance in a way of collective self-determination.
The resistance and civil disobedience on the streets that are manifested through multiple forms are unfolding in real time on a daily basis. Protestors are shaping a specific infrastructure of solidarity on-site, which is getting more and more tangible in ways of remarkable unity and organisation. This infrastructure has strengthened over time, that then has helped the movement to adapt and expand.
What began on Rustaveli Avenue, has now decentralised, as the demonstrations are spread across various districts in Tbilisi and even in small rural cities of Georgia – places with no prior history of hosting such protests. There is a rotating system protestors use to ensure a continuous presence. Some remain on the streets from afternoon until late evening, whereas others replace them to hold the space through the night. This wave of protests is often met with the harshest dispersion, as police forces use brutal tactics, ranging from violent, unjust arrests, beatings, to threats of rape.
These acts of state violence have further helped the movement to expand, reinforcing the power of people to demand freedom.
The country currently is paralysed, and today we see dozens of arrests of opposition party leaders, bloggers, and activists, that have a strong positionality in the political scene. This brings back the wave of repressions that also has been the case during the summer when governmental forces were calling and violently threatening ordinary citizens attempting to silence them. Even though the regime remains aggressive, the resilience of the movement also alters itself to adapt to the present circumstances. What can be seen on TikTok is a great representation of how memeified the protest movement has become.
And lastly, what we also see is the emergence of gender dynamics within the protests, which further ridicules the governmental forces having any legitimacy while claiming they are the representation of the people’s aspirations – statements that are far removed from reality.
Links to the pdf, epub and the Lulu page to order a paper copy can be found 
